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THE TREATMENT OF SPS MEASURES 
UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11: PRELIMINARY 
ANSWERS TO AN OPEN-ENDED QUESTION 
ToDD WEILER* 
Abstract: NAFTA Chapter 11 permits eligible foreign investors to use 
binding international arbitration to seek compensation for the harmful 
economic impacts of most regulatory measures. This mechanism 
effectiYely provides a second avenue of redress for indiYiduals affected 
by risk regulation, in addition to any remedies that may be available to 
their governments acting through the WfO. However, because not all 
risks are equal, neither are all regulations of equal importance. It 
follows that the international regimes, which regulate the use of these 
measures, must be able to differentiate between them. In this regard, 
there is a need to interpret the more general investment obligations of 
NAFTA to take into account the importance of regulating risks to 
human, plant, or animal life or health. This article explains the way in 
which principles drawn from much more detailed wro sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary rules can be used to achieve this result. 
I have been asked to address the question of how science is re-
garded within the context of a North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) t Chapter 11 investment dispute. This is a very difficult ques-
tion because no investment tribunal has answered it within the con-
text of a merit award. Moreover, no such award is imminent. This 
dearth of relevant case law is not surprising, given that (as of the time 
of writing) there have only been seven final awards issued during the 
first nine years of NAFTA's existence. Moreover, less than two dozen 
NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes have proceeded to arbitration thus far. 
Although there have been hundreds of disputes launched in the 
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I North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 107 Stat. 
2057 (1994), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
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World Trade Organization (WTO) context, only three have been ad-
judicated involving the WTO's "trade and science" provisions, which 
can be found in the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary 
Measures (WTO SPS Agreement). 2 
Nonetheless, considerable concern has been expressed with re-
gard to the way in which a NAFTA Investment Tribunal might deal 
with an investment dispute given that none of the NAFTA Chapter 11 
provisions explicitly address the role of science in disputes involving 
risk regulation in the fields of human, plant, and animal life or 
health.3 While the jurisprudence definitely indicates that Sanitary and 
Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures would be subjected to Chapter 11 dis-
ciplines, those disciplines do not include even a rudimentary excep-
tion provision such as those found in NAFTA Article 2102(1) and 
General Agreement of Tariffs· and Trade (GATI) Article XX(b), 
much less anything as detailed as the NAFTA or WTO SPS provisions. 
The purpose of this paper is to address this uncertainty by providing a 
road map for consideration by future NAFTA tribunals when they are 
presented with an SPS measure. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF NAFT A 
Negotiated simultaneously with and similar in content to the 
WTO Uruguay Round Agreement, 4 NAFTA contains several inter-
linked sets of obligations grouped by chapter, as opposed to "agree-
ment" in the WTO context.5 In addition, NAFTA contains chapters on 
intellectual property law, technical barriers to trade, and trade in serv-
ices, all of which bear some connection (if not a strong resemblance) 
to their WTO cousins. NAFTA Chapter 7B, concerning SPS measures, 
is no exception. NAFTA Articles 712, 714, and 715 largely cover the 
same ground covered by Articles 2 and 5 of the WTO SPS Agreement. 
In contrast, however, there is nothing in the WTO Agreements com-
2 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter 
WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS oF TilE URUGUAY RouND 
vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1153 (1994) [hereinafter WTO SPS Agreement]. 
3 See, e.g., Frank E. Loy, On a Collision Course? Two Potential Environmental Conflicts Be-
tween the U.S. and Canada, 28 CAN-U.S. LJ. 11, 19 (2002). 
4 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF TilE URUGUAY RoUND vol. 1 
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994). 
5 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2102(1 ). 
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parable to NAFTA Chapter 11-which was based on the U.S. Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty.6 
Based upon a cursory review of their handiwork, it appears that 
the drafters of NAFTA carefully addressed potential conflicts and 
overlaps within NAFTA provisions, and between NAFTA and other 
treaties. For example, Article 103(2) provides that NAFTA provisions 
will trump all other treaties to whatever extent may be necessary, un-
less otherwise provided in NAFTA. 7 Article 104 ( 1) provides that the 
provisions of a number of prominent environmental treaties (includ-
ing the CITES, the MontTeal Protocol and the Basel Convention) will 
trump NAFTA provisions, so long as the least inconsistent approach 
to compliance with NAFTA obligations has been chosen.8 
With Article 1101 (3), the drafters further specified that Chapter 
11 does not apply to measures covered by Chapter 14 (concerning 
financial services) .9 By means of Article 1112, they provided that "in 
the event of any inconsistency between this Chapter and another 
Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsis-
tency. "10 The drafters created Article 710 to ensure that Articles 301 
and 309 (requiring national treatment and prohibiting export and 
import restrictions for trade-in-goods measures) and GATT Article 
XX(b) (as incorporated into NAFTA Article 2101 (1)) do not apply to 
any SPS measure." However, the drafters notably were silent as to 
what should be done in cases of overlap-as opposed to conflict-
between NAFTA obligations. 
Numerous NAFTA tribunals have addressed authoritatively the 
subject of overlap between NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions and be-
tween NAFTA provisions and other treaty obligations. In these cases, 
the NAFTA governments argued that Chapter 11 obligations could 
not apply to measures that could be addressed more appropriately 
under a different chapter. For example, in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Can-
ada, it was argued that the measure at issue-an export quota regime 
for softwood lumber-was clearly aimed at trade in goods, rather than 
the regulation of investment. Accordingly, the measures could not be 
6 Pope & Talbot, Inc.\'. Canada, para. 111 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., Apr. 10, 2001) 
(final merits award), available at http:/ /www.naftaclaims,com [hereinafter Pope & Talbot 
Final Merits Award]. 
7 NAFTA, supra note 1, art, 103(2), 
Bfd.art.104(1). 
9Jd. art, 1101 (3). 
10 !d. art. 1112. 
11 !d. arts. 301,309,710, 2102(1). 
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addressed under Chapter 11. In rejecting these arguments, the Pope 
& Talbot Tribunal concluded: 
It appears to the Tribunal that Canada's arguments fail in 
two quite different ways: 
In the first place, where a quota system is involved of the 
type here under consideration, it necessarily involves that 
quota be directly conferred upon or removed from enter-
prises. It is not a mere linguistic truism to say that such a sys-
tem directly applies to a particular enterprise, namely each 
of the relevant softwood lumber producers in the listed prov-
inces. It directly affects their ability to trade in the goods 
they seek to produce, but it can equally be described as the 
way that the measures applied to the various enterprises af-
fect the total trade in the relevant products. 
In the second place, the fact that a measure may be pri-
marily concerned with trade in goods does not necessarily 
mean that it does not also relate to investment or investors. 
By way of example, an attempt by a Party to require all pro-
ducers of a particular good located in its territory to pur-
chase all of a specified raw material from persons in its terri-
tory may well be said to be a measure relating to trade in 
goods. But it is clear from the terms of Article 1106 that it is 
also a measure relating to investment insofar as it might af-
fect an enterprise owned by an investor of a Party.12 
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, the Tribunal similarly concluded that an 
investor was not precluded from receiving compensation for business 
activity harmed in breach of Articles 1102 and 1105 merely because 
the activity could also be characterised as the cross-border provision 
of a service under NAFTA Chapter 12.13 In ADF Group, Inc. v. United 
States, the Tribunal reached a similar conclusion involving a procure-
ment subsidy dispute over steel to be used in a Virginia highway proj-
ect.l4 
12 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, para. 33 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., Jan. 26, 2000) 
(award on mot. to dismiss), available at http:/ /www.naftalaw.org. 
IS S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, paras. 123-38 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., Oct. 21, 2002), 
available at http:/ /www.state.gov/5/l/c3754.htm. [hereinafter Myers Final Award]. 
14 ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, para. 155 (NAFTA/ICSID(AF) Trib., Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/l,Jan. 9, 2003) (final award), available at http:/ /www.naftalaw.org [hereinaf-
ter ADF Group Final Award]. 
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However, investors will have no claim for the indirect yet harmful 
effects of a measure that regulates goods for which they only produce 
an important ingredient. This was the case in Methanex Cmporation v. 
United States, where the investor produced methanol, one of the pri-
mary ingredients of the gasoline additive methyl tertiary-butyl ether 
(MTBE).15 The measure at issue only banned MTBE, making no men-
tion of methanol. The Tribunal's conclusion was essentially a matter 
of determining whether proximate cause exists under Article 1101(1); 
this would require that the measure "relate to" investors or invest-
ments.16 
Given the potential for overlap between NAFTA obligations, as 
opposed to outright conflict, it is quite likely that an SPS measure will 
some day represent the focal point of a NAFTA investment dispute. 
To date, only four such cases have emerged, one of which settled at a 
preliminary phaseP At the end of this paper, I will consider briefly 
the facts of the remaining three cases within the context of the ap-
propriate SPS principles. However, first it is necessary to explain how 
NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions can be interpreted, particularly in light 
of those principles. 
II. lNTF.RPRETING NAFT A CHAPTER 11 WITH SPS MEASURES IN MIND 
NAFTA Article 1131 provides that tribunals established to hear 
investors' claims under Chapter 11 "shall decide the issues in dispute 
in accordance with [NAFTA] and applicable rules of international 
law. "18 Many tribunals thus far have concluded that, for the purpose of 
interpreting the text of NAFTA, the applicable rules of international 
law are the customary international law rules of treaty interpreta-
tion.19 These rules have been codified in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: 
15 1-.Iethanex Corp. v. United States, (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., Aug. 7, 2002) (award 
on jmisdiction & admissibility), available at http:/ /www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/ 12613.pdf [hereinafter Methanex Final Award]. 
16 /d. para. 147. 
17 Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708 ( 1999) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., June 24, 
1998) (award on jurisdiction) [hereinafter Ethyl Award]; Kenex Ltd. v. United States 
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., Jan. 14, 2002) (notice of Intent to submit a Claim to Arbitra-
tion), available at http:/ /www.naftaclaims.org; Crompton Corp. v. Canada, (NAFTA Dis-
pute, Nov. 6, 2001 ), available at http:/ /www.naftalaw.org; Methanex Corp., supra note 15. 
IS NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1131 (1). 
19 Sec, e.g., Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, para. 43 (NAFTA/ICSID (AF) Trib., Case 
No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Oct. 11, 2002) (final award), available at http:/ /www.naftalaw.org 
[hereinafter Monde\· Final Award]; sec also Ethyl Award, supra note 17, at paras. 50-51; 
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1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes: 
a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connection with the conclu-
sion of the treaty; 
b) Any instrument which was made by one or more par-
ties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related 
to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the con-
text: 
a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regard-
ing the interpretation of the treaty or the application of 
its provisions; 
b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regard-
ing its interpretation; 
c) Any rei evant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is estab-
lished that the parties so intended.2o 
Article 31 ( 1) of the Vienna Convention provides the golden rule 
of treaty interpretation.21 It requires a tribunal to focus on the plain 
meaning of the text before it while being mindful not only of its 
placement within the context of the treaty but also of the objects and 
purposes of that treaty. The textual focus naturally will predominate 
where the object and purposes of a treaty are not provided explicitly. 
This is not the case for NAFTA, however, which provides tribunals 
with considerable guidance in this regard. NAFTA provides both a list 
WfO Appellate Body Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Com·en-
tional Gasoline, Wf/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996), 35 I.LM. 603, 624 (1996); or Japan-
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Wf/DSS/ AB/R, Wf/DS10/ AB/R, Wf/DSll/ AB/R, at 9-
12 (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan Alcoholic Beverages]. 
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U .N.T.S. 331, 
8 I.LM. 679 (1969). 
21 ld. art. 31 (1). 
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of its objectives and a prescription for how its text must be inter-
preted. Article 102 states: 
Objectives 
1. The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more 
specifically through its principles and rules, including na-
tional treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and trans-
parency, are to: 
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-
border movement of, goods and services between the 
territories of the Parties; 
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free 
trade area; 
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the 
territories of the Parties; 
(d) provide adequate and effective protection and en-
forcement of intellectual property rights in each 
Party's territory; 
(e) create effective procedures for the implementation 
and application of this Agreement, for its joint ad-
ministration and for the resolution of disputes; and 
(f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional 
and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance 
the benefits of this Agreement. 
2. The Parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of this 
Agreement in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph 
1 and in accordance with applicable rules of international 
law.22 
The first panel established to hear a NAITA dispute noted the 
importance of "the trade liberalization background against which the 
agreements under consideration must be interpreted" and concluded 
that "[a]ny interpretation adopted by the Panel must, therefore, pro-
mote rather than inhibit the NAFTA's objectives."23 In Metalclad Corp. 
v. Mexico, the Tribunal echoed this approach, noting in its Final 
Award that the principle of transparency and the objective of substan-
tially increasing investment opportunities in the North American Free 
22 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102. 
23 Canada-Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, 
CDA-95-2008-01, Dec. 2, 1996, para. 122, available at http:/ /www.worldtradelaw.net/ 
nafta20/agtariffs.pdf. This was an arbitration panel established pursuant to NAFTA Article 
2008. !d. 
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Trade Area were both important elements of the interpretative analy-
sis to be used under NAFTA.24 
Article 102(1) is very specific in the manner in which it lays out 
the appropriate context for interpretation ofNAFTA's text. It not only 
sets out the goals of substantially increasing investment opportunities 
and promoting "conditions of fair competition" in the free trade area, 
but it also provides that these objectives are "elaborated more 
specifically through its principles and rules," which include national 
treatment, most favored nation treatment, and transparency.25 These 
three "principles and rules" represent the bedrock of international eco-
nomic law, which can be found within countless treaty provisions and 
throughout the burgeoning jurisprudence of international economic 
law, including the reports of WfO panels and the WfO Appellate 
Body (Appellate Body) described below.26 It is accordingly appro-
priate for a tribunal to have recourse to other trade and investment 
treaties, as well as the wider jurisprudence of international economic 
law, in interpreting the NAFTA text in a manner that is consonant 
with its broadly liberalizing objectives. 
As the Tribunal in S.D. Myers stated, the preambular language of 
a treaty shall be construed as part of the context in which the treaty 
text is situated.27 In this regard, it is important to note, however, that 
NAFTA does have objectives other than trade and investment liberali-
zation. NAFTA's preamble includes resolutions to "UNDERTAKE 
each of the preceding [liberalizing goals] in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation; PRESERVE their 
flexibility to safeguard the public welfare; PROMOTE sustainable de-
velopment; [and] STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement 
of environmental laws and regulations. "28 
This preambular language provides the context within which 
NAFTA provisions should be interpreted when an SPS or environ-
mental protection measure is at issue. The Appellate Body adopted a 
similar approach in its Report on United States-Import Prohibition of 
24 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (200I), para. 70 (NAFTA/ 
ICSID(AF) Trib., Case No. Arb(AF)/97 /I, Aug. 30, 2000) (final award) [hereinafter 
Metalclad Final Award]. 
25 NAFTA, supra note I, art. I 02 (I). 
26 See id. 
27 While covered in the Tribunal's award, the importance of environmental provisions 
in the NAFTA, including its preambular language, is highlighted in the Opinion of Arbi-
trator Schwartz, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, paras. I07-I8 (Nov. I2, 2000), available at 
http:/ /www.naftalaw.org. 
2s NAFTA, supra note I, pmbl. 
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Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, in which the mention of "sus-
tainable development" in preambular language was used to interpret 
GATI Article XX(g) in a more expansive manner.29 As David Wirth 
has noted, given that the nascent international law principle of pre-
caution is an essential component of the concept of "sustainable de-
velopment," it would seem that the NAFTA Parties essentially have 
agreed that an appropriate level of precaution should be permitted 
for regulatory decisions covered under NAFTA as a whole.3o The logi-
cal extension of this approach is to read into NAFTA Chapter 11 pro-
visions the same balance of obligations that exists in the provisions of 
Chapter 7B, concerning the regulation of SPS measures. 
As Wirth concluded shortly after NAFTA came into force in 1994, 
"the presence and integrity of scientific support is a principle touch-
stone for determining the legitimacy of many national regulatory ef-
forts aimed at ensuring environmental integrity or safeguarding pub-
lic health. "31 The SPS obligations contained within both NAFTA and 
the \VTO Agreement embodied the idea that the discipline of sci-
entific methods could be used to unearth protectionism in measures 
based on putatively valid, "scientific" claims. While many, including 
Wirth, have questioned whether science is up to the task, none have 
argued seriously against this use of science in principle.32 
Considering the provisions contained within NAFTA Chapter 7B 
and the \VTO SPS Agreement, as well as the SPS jurisprudence that 
has emerged thus far from the WTO, it would appear that there are 
five fundamental principles that apply in consideration of SPS meas-
ures.33 First, there is a clear recognition of the sovereign right of states 
29 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, \VT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. l18, para. 129 
(1999). 
go DaYid A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 
27 CoRNHL INT'L LJ. 817, 839 (1994). 
31 /d. at 818. 
g2 See, e.g., id. at 833; Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evi-
dence Requirements: A. Pessimistic l'iew, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 353, 354-55 (2002); Jan Bohanes, 
Risk Regulation in llTO Law: A PITJcedure-Based App1Vach to the Precautionary Principle, 40 
CoLUM.j. TRANSNA"r'L L. 323, 354-59(2002). 
g3 This jurisprudence is limited to three Appellate Body reports: WTO Appellate Body 
Report on Japan-Measures Mfecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R (Feb 22, 1999), 
38 I.L.l\f. 255 (1999) [hereinafter Japanese Agricultural Products Report]; WTO Appellate 
Body Report on Australia-Measures Mfecting Importation of Salmon, WT /DS18/ AB/R 
(Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Australian Salmon Report]; WTO Appellate Body Report on 
European Community Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT /DS26/ AB/R, 
WT /DS48/ AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormones Report]. 
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to formulate, adopt, and maintain SPS measures based on a level of 
protection that is considered appropriate in the circumstances by 
those states.34 Second, SPS measures must not be adopted or main-
tained without sufficient scientific basis and must be based on an ap-
propriate scientific risk assessment.35 Third, SPS measures must only 
be adopted or maintained when it is necessary to do so.36 Fourth, SPS 
measures must result neither in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion, nor in a disguised restriction on economic activity protected un-
der the treaty.37 Finally, SPS measures must be developed and imposed 
in a transparent manner. 38 
In varying degrees, these five principles can be used to interpret 
the relevant provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11. The general authority 
for their consideration by a NAFTA tribunal can be found in NAFTA 
Article 1131 (1) and in Article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. 
NAFTA Article 1131 (1) requires tribunals to decide matters before 
them in accordance with NAFTA itself and the "applicable rules of 
international law."39 In a dispute involving an SPS measure, surely 
these principles must be considered to be "applicable rules of interna-
tional law." The three NAFTA Parties have twice agreed to the provi-
sions (both in NAFTA and also in the WfO). They also have agre<::d, 
in the NAFTA preamble, that protection of the environment and sus-
tainable development are necessary elements of NAFTA's context, to 
be considered in the interpretation of provisions that are otherwise 
informed by the broad objectives of trade-liberalization and the pro-
motion of economic competition. This group of five SPS principles 
reflects the manifestation of that very same balance-between the 
authority to impose SPS measures and the need to constrain their use 
to "legitimate cases" in order to experience the economic develop-
ment that comes from increased trade and investment. 
If there was any doubt as to the applicability of these principles, it 
can be answered by Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention, which 
two NAFTA tribunals and various commentators have noted is rele-
!l4 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 712(1), (2); WfO SPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts 2.1, 
3.3. 
! 5 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 712(3), 715; WfO SPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 2.2, 
5.1, 5.2, 5.3. 
!l6 NAFTA, supra note 1, 712(5); WfO SPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 2.2, 5.6. 
! 7 The protected economic activity in the WfO context is trade in goods. For the 
NAFTA, it appears to include any trade activity (whether goods or services). NAFTA, supra 
note 1, art. 712(4), (6); WfO SPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 2.3, 5.5. 
!l6 NAFTA, sttpra note 1, art. 718; WfO SPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7, Annex B. 
39 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131 (1). 
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vant to the consideration of the impact of external international obli-
gations on the interpretation of treaty text.40 In this sense, it might be 
useful to recall that Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court oflnter-
national Justice provides that treaties are a source of "international 
law" and that the decisions of international tribunals are a legitimate, 
subsidiary source of "international law."41 Accordingly, it is only logi-
cal to consider the SPS principles, which can be derived from the 
texts and jurisprudence of the NAITA and WfO texts, as being "rele-
vant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties" under Article 31 (3) (c) and as "applicable rules of interna-
tional law" under NAITA Article 1131 (1). The alternative-to inter-
pret the provisions in a vacuum, as if these SPS principles did not ex-
ist-is simply unacceptable.42 
The three types of NAFTA Chapter 11 obligations that are most 
likely to be invoked with respect to an SPS measure are the following: 
( 1) the prohibition against discrimination under Articles 1102 and 
1103 (concerning national treatment and most-favored nation (MFN) 
treatment, respectively); (2) the minimum standard of treatment un-
der Article 1105; and (3) compensation for expropriation under Arti-
cle 1110. The first of these obligations provides a comparative analysis 
designed to provide an effective equality of opportunities between 
like investors or investments. The second obligation provides a floor 
below which no regulatory treatment should fall.43 The third provides 
compensation for the rare case in which a business is completely frus-
trated due to the imposition of a measure. 
40 Sec, e.g., United States-In the Matter of Cross Border Trucking Services, para. 221 
(USA-MEX-98-2008-01 Feb. 6, 2001) [hereinafter United States-Trucking]; Ethyl Award, 
supra note 17, para. 51; Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settkment and Human Rights, 13 
EuR. J. INT'L L. 753, 782 (2002); Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A 
Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3]. WoRLD INTEL. PROP. 493, 504 (2000). 
41 Statute of the Court oflnternationaljustice, Oct. 24, 1945, 832 U.S.T.D. 993. 
42 It is also useful to note that NAFTA Article 709 connotes an extremely broad pur-
view for the application of the NAFTA's SPS obligations, indicating that they apply to "any 
such measure of a Party that may, directly or indirectly, affect trade between the Parties." 
The implication is that the NAFTA's drafters wanted to stress the importance of the bal-
ance they struck between legitimate protection and protectionism, using science as one of 
the arbitral tests. 
4! S.D. Myers, Inc. ,., Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, para. 260 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., 
Nm·. 13, 2000) (interim merits award) [hereinafter Myers Interim Merits Award]. 
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III. NoN-DISCRIMINATION (ARTICLES II 02-1104) 
In order to prove a violation of NAFTA Article 1102, a claimant 
must demonstrate that a measure has resulted in the investor or in-
vestment receiving less favourable treatment than any other domestic 
competitor, regardless of whether there was any intent on the part of 
the Government to provide less favourable treatment because the in-
vestor or investment was foreign (or, conversely, to provide better 
treatment to a local competitor because it is local). For Article 1103, 
the comparator is another foreigner. Article 1104 merely ensures that 
the best treatment accorded through the application of both of Arti-
cles 1102 and 1103 is provided. 
Five tribunals have issued awards concerning the interpretation 
of Article 1102.44 Each decision has contributed to a consistent and 
coherent approach to the non-discrimination obligations contained 
within NAFTA. This approach has been adopted universally because it 
provides a familiar touchstone for tribunal members and counsel, 
who have recourse to a wealth of applicable wro jurisprudence on 
non-discrimination. Comparatively, there is a relative dearth of mod-
ern (and relevant) jurisprudence available for the interpretation of 
Articles II 05 and Ill 0 in a modern regulatory con text. 
The Pope & Talbot Tribunal set the standard for the interpreta-
tion of NAFTA's non-discrimination provisions, building upon the 
analysis found in Myers and US-Trucking.45 This analysis can be re-
duced to three basic elements: 
(1) Identification ofthe relevant subjects for comparison; 
(2) Consideration of the relative treatment received by each 
comparator; and 
(3) Consideration of whether any factors exist which could 
justify any difference in treatment so found. 
The initial comparison is made between the claimant or its in-
vestment and any domestic investors or investments operating in the 
same business or economic sector. For the Pope & Talbot Tribunal, the 
relevant class of comparators was composed of those engaged in the 
44 !d.; Pope & Talbot Final Merits Award, supra note 6; United States-Trucking, supra 
note 40; ADF Group Final Award, supra note 14; Marvin Feldman v. United Mexican States, 
(NAFTA/ICSID(AF) Trib., Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Dec. 16, 2002) (final award) [here-
inafter Feldman Final Award]. 
45 Pope & Talbot Final Merits Award, supra note 6, paras. 31-81, particularly para. 78. 
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production of softwood lumber in Canada.46 For the Myers Tribunal, 
the class was composed of Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB) destruc-
tion firms attempting to operate in Canada.47 For the US-Trucking 
Panel, the class was composed of trucking firms who might attempt to 
operate in the United States.48 For the Feldman Tribunal, the "appli-
cable universe" of comparable investors and investments was com-
posed of those businesses engaged in the purchase and resale of ciga-
rettes, rather than a wider group that could have included 
manufacturers. 49 For the ADF Tribunal, the point of comparison was 
between specialized steel products used by the investor (a steel fabri-
cator) and similar steel products used by domestic competitors, with 
respect to their potential use in a highway project.50 By necessary im-
plication, the ADFTribunal's comparison focused on firms operating 
in the steel fabrication business as its "universe" of comparable inves-
tors under Article 1102 ( 1). 
To examine whether the treatment received was more or less fa-
vourable, it is useful to recall that the goal of any non-discrimination 
obligation essentially is to provide the foreign firm with the promise 
of an effective equality of competitive opportunities between it and its 
competitors.51 To achieve this goal, one considers the question of 
"treatment" under this test in terms of a comparison between that 
which has been received by the foreigner and the best level of treat-
ment made available to any other domestic investor or investment op-
erating in like circumstances (or any other foreigner under the MFN 
standard). This comparison also is not limited to an evaluation of 
whether the treatment received is substantially similar. The focus is on 
the results of the treatment received.52 
Such a rationale was employed by the ADF Tribunal in its dis-
missal of the claim against the United States, and by the Feldman Tri-
bunal to conclude that a prima facie claim existed against Mexico. For 
46 /d. paras. 73-80. 
47 Myers Interim Merits Av;ard, supra note 43, paras. 243-51. 
48 United States-Trucking, supra note 40, paras. 253, 286. 
49 Feldman Final Award, supra note 44, paras. 171-72. 
5° ADF Group Final Award, supra note 14, para. 155. 
51 See, e.g., United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,36 (1989) B.I.S.D. 345, 
at paras. 5.13-5.14; Japan Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 19, at 6; vVTO Appellate Body 
Report on Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic BeYerages, WT /DS75/ AB/R, WT /DS84/ AB/R 
(jan. 18, 1999), para. 119; WTO Panel Report on Canada-Certain Measures Mfecting the 
Automoth·e Industry, \VT/DS139/R. WT/DS142/R, para. 10.78 (jan. 31, 2000), available 
at http:/ /www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/dispu_e/6100d.pdf. 
5~ See, e.g .• Mvers Interim Merits Award, supra note 43, para. 254; Pope & Talbot Final 
1\ferits Award, supra note 6, paras. 41-42, 70. 
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the ADF Tribunal, it was a matter of evidence, or lack thereof. The 
Tribunal concluded basically that ADF failed to provide "specific evi-
dence concerning the comparative economics of the situation" in or-
der to prove that the competitive position of Canadian-based contrac-
tors was disadvantaged, as compared to U.S.-based contractors, 
because of the imposition of the measure. 53 
By contrast, Feldman proved to his Tribunal that he was sub-
jected to an audit process which was not imposed similarly on his 
primary domestic competitors, and that they had received tax rebates 
that were withheld from him. Accordingly, Feldman established a 
prima facie case of discrimination. It was not necessary for him to 
prove that he was receiving less favorable treatment because he was a 
foreigner, only that he was a foreigner receiving worse treatment than 
a comparable investor or investment. 54 
Once a prima facie breach of a non-discrimination provision has 
been established, the onus shifts to the respondent government to 
justify the difference in treatment. If the government can prove that 
the treatment was different because the comparators truly were not in 
"like circumstances," it will have justified the measure.55 In Feldman, 
because Mexico failed to provide any explanation as to why it had 
treated the claimant differently than his competitors, it lost the case. 
Chaired by the same person, the Myers Tribunal and the US-
Trucking Panel both treated this final portion of the non-
discrimination analysis as a "like circumstances exemption. "56 In other 
words, both read into the notion of "like circumstances" the kinds of 
protection for regulatory activity that only exist under GATT Article 
XX for the manner of application of the measure (rather than the 
measure itself). While this approach represents a potential broaden-
ing of the scope for exemptions under NAFTA's non-discrimination 
obligations, neither case actually used the "like circumstances exemp-
tion." In Myers, the U.S. claimant was shut out ofthe Canadian market 
for PCB destruction on the protectionist whim of a Cabinet member 
who ignored the advice of her own bureaucrats. In US-Trucking, no 
Mexican trucking firms were eligible to apply for permission to oper-
ate in the United States, regardless of whether they could prove that 
they met the same standards which apply to Canadian and American 
55 ADF Group Final Award, supra note 14, para. 157. 
5* Feldman Final Award, supra note 44, para. 181. 
55 See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Final Merits Award, supra note 6, paras. 78-79; United 
States-Trucking, supra note 40, at 258-60. 
56 United States-Trucking, supra note 40, paras. 258-60. 
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firms. Both the Tribunal and the Panel accordingly found liability 
under the national treatment obligation. 
A more useful case in demonstrating the manner in which the 
third branch of the national treatment test should be applied can be 
found in the Final Merits Award of the Pope & Talbot Tribunal. While 
the facts did not involve an SPS measure, the Tribunal's analysis 
clearly established that once a prima facie difference in treatment 
among a class of comparators has been proved, the respondent must 
prove ''whether there is a reasonable nexus between the measure and 
a rational, non-discriminatory government policy, [and] whether 
those policies are embodied in statute, regulation or international 
agreement. "57 In that case, Canada proved that while its export con-
trol regime provided the claimant with worse treatment than other 
industry members, there was a reasonable connection between the 
measure and Canada's need to honor an agreement with the U.S. 
Government, which forestalled the imposition of U.S. anti-dumping 
duties against all lumber exports from Canada. 
For SPS measures, the language of the Pope & Talbot Tribunal is 
reminiscent of two SPS principles: the right ofNAFTA governments to 
develop and impose such measures, and the prohibition against any 
measure which results in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or 
in a disguised restriction on economic activity. In the context of Arti-
cles 1102 and 1103, the right to develop and impose an SPS measure 
is safeguarded in the Tribunal's analysis because it would be a pre-
sumptively "rational, non-discriminatory public policy." However, a 
reasonable nexus must be demonstrated between the impact of the 
measure and this goal. The Appellate Body has provided an analysis of 
Article 5.5 of the WTO SPS Agreement which can provide some guid-
ance in this regard. It noted that the obligation would be breached in 
cases where: 
• the government is not requiring comparable levels of pro-
tection in comparable situations; 
• the failure to do so is arbitrary or unjustifiable (i.e. unrea-
sonable); and 
• such measures result in discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on international trade.5B 
57 Pope & Talbot Final Merits Award, supra note 6, para. 81. 
58 Beef Hormones Report, supra note 33, para. 214. 
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By this point of the Article 1102 and 1103 analysis, the first and 
third elements of this test normally will have been established already. 
Accordingly, the most interesting element of the WfO SPS analysis is 
the second prong, concerning what constitutes arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination. In the Australian Salmon Report, Australia 
banned all salmon from outside its territory that was not heat-treated 
in order to protect against twenty-four different fish-borne diseases 
not native to Australia. However, it did not similarly ban the importa-
tion and unregulated use of ornamental fish nor bait fish, even 
though both activities posed a greater risk of infecting native fish. 
Australia's explanation was that it had not yet conducted proper risk 
assessments on those comparable products. The Appellate Body 
found this justification to be unacceptable. It found that varying de-
grees of risk between products or situations could provide a valid justi-
fication for differences in treatment, but such was not the case here. 
Australia simply insisted on a conservative risk level for salmon but 
apparently was indifferent to the greater risks posed by the use of or-
namental and bait fish. The additional fact that the measure was 
modified to eliminate a possible exemption for salmon after the gov-
ernment received input from domestic competitors also did not help 
to justifY the measure.59 
The Appellate Body's analysis in the Beef Hormones Report is 
unhelpful in this regard, however, as it concluded that there was no 
arbitrary or unjustifiable treatment because naturally occurring hor-
mones and administered hormones in food are intrinsically different. 
It similarly concluded that a difference exists between hormones ad-
ministered for zoological purposes and those administered for thera-
peutic purposes.oo In doing so, the Appellate Body effectively con-
cluded that there were no valid comparators at issue, but rather that 
these practices were comparable, though treated differently for a 
good reason. 
With respect to the inclusion of SPS principles in the NAFTA 
non-discrimination analysis, the bottom line is that Articles 1102 and 
1103 allow for an analysis that respects the SPS bargain. An explicit 
exhortation need not exist in the plain text, because it already exists 
in the text as interpreted within the context of the NAFTA and the 
applicable rules of international law. To the extent that differences in 
treatment cannot be reasonably connected to a rational policy, such as 
59 Australian Salmon Report, supra note 33, paras. 84-85. 
60 Beef Hormones Report, supra note 33, paras. 221-23. 
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an SPS policy, they will not be justified and compensation will be pay-
able for any damages that flow from their imposition. 
IV. NAFTAARTICLE 1105 
Article 1105(1) states that investments must be provided with 
"treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security. "61 On July 31, 
2001, the NAFTA Parties issued a statement which added the follow-
ing concepts to any Article 1105 interpretation: 
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the mini-
mum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of 
investors of another Party. 
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and 
"full protection and security" do not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by the custom-
ary international law minimum standard of treatment of ali-
ens. 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of an-
other provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international 
agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach 
of Article 1105 ( 1) .62 
Three awards were rendered in 2002 that addressed the interpre-
tation of Article 1105. Despite some initial misgivings, tribunals have 
concluded that the statement is binding upon them under NAFTA 
Article 1131 (2).63 Accordingly, if any investors (such as Methanex) 
were hoping to rely upon the breach of a WfO obligation as an 
automatic breach of the "international law" referred to in Article 
1105, such hopes have essentially been dashed.64 
On the other hand, based upon the jurisprudence that has 
evolved since the NAFTA Parties released their statement on interpre-
tation, it also would appear that particular hopes shared by the 
61 NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1105(1). 
62 North American Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, July 31, 2001 ), at http:/ /www.dfait-maeci.go. 
ca/tha-nac/NAFTA-lnterpr_en.asp. (last visited Mar. 14, 2003). 
63 Sec, e.g .. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, para. 51 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., May 31, 
2002) (damages award), available atwww.naftalaw.org [hereinafter Pope & Talbot Damages 
Awatd]. 
64 See, e.g., Mondev Final Award, supra note 19, para. 121. 
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NAFfA governments similarly have been dashed. For example, the 
United States hoped that the statement on interpretation would re-
strict claimants to making Article 1105 claims only based on fully-
crystallized rules of customary international law-of which there are 
very few.65 NAFfA Governments also have been disappointed because 
their arguments concerning the threshold of treatment covered by 
the reinterpreted Article 1105 have been unanimously rejected. They 
argued that the only circumstances that could breach Article 1105 
would be those which fell below an extremely high threshold, artint-
lated in a 1926 dispute with Mexico: "to an outrage, to bad faith, to 
wilful neglect of duty or to insufficiency of government action so far 
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial 
man would readily recognize its insufficiency. "66 
Instead, the approach to Article 1105 that has been adopted re-
cently by two high-calibre tribunals can be summarised as follows. 
First, the standard of treatment imposed by Article 1105 is a "floor" 
under which no conduct should fall. 67 Second, not all acts of pettiness 
or unfairness will rise to the level of an international wrong, particu-
larly in deference to the sovereign right of States to protect their citi-
zens.68 Third, the content of the minimum standard in any given case 
is highly contextual.69 Finally, it is important to rely upon any relevant 
source of international law (including treaty obligations) to prove the 
content of that minimum standard in any given case.70 
For the purposes of reviewing most regulatory measures under 
NAFfA Article 1105, there are two customary international law doc-
trines which can inform a tribunal's interpretation: denials of justice 
and the abuse of rights. Professor Garcia-Amador's work on the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens is regarded widely as an 
authoritative statement of the customary international law standard as 
it existed thirty years ago. With respect to denials of justice, Professor 
Garcia-Amador included numerous judicial, quasi-judicial, and ad-
65 ADF Group Final Award, supra note 14, para. 185. 
66 United States (L.F. Neer) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 3 I.L.R. 213, para. 
4 (1927) (US-Mexico Claims Commission 1926) [hereinafter Neer]. Neerwas rejected, for 
example, by the Mondev Tribunal in its Final Award. Mondev Final Award, supra note 19, 
para. 115. The Neer claim involved an allegation of denial of justice because Mexico had 
allegedly failed to prosecute those who had murdered Mr. Neer. 
67 Myers Final Award, supra note 13, para. 260. 
68 /d. para. 263. 
69 See Mondev Final Award, supra note 19, para. 118. 
70 See ADF Group Final Award, supra note 14, paras. 184-85. 
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ministratiYe or regulatory bodies within the scope of a denial of jus-
tice claim, noting: 
A decision or judgment of a tribunal or an administrative 
authority rendered in a proceeding involving the determina-
tion of the civil rights or obligations of an alien or of any 
criminal charges against him, and either denying him recov-
ery in whole or in part or granting recovery against him or 
imposing a penalty, whether civil or criminal, upon him is 
wrongful: 
a) if it is a clear and discriminatory violation of the law 
the State concerned; 
b) if it unreasonably departs from the principles of justice 
recognized by the principal legal systems of the world; or 
c) if it otherwise involves a violation by the State of a 
treaty. 71 
The right to hold property has been recognized explicitly by the 
NAFTA Parties through its ratification of the NAFTA, which provides 
for protection of a wide range of property interests included in the 
definition of "investment" under Article 1138. Accordingly, it is largely 
beyond dispute that a government decision that affects the right to 
enjoy property could attract international responsibility to a state. 
This does not mean, howeYer, that a mere error of domestic law or a 
minor procedural defect will constitute a denial of justice. There must 
be something more,72 
The hallmark of a substantive denial of justice can be found in 
the arbitrariness of the decision in question. A decision is arbitrary, 
and a denial of justice, if it is "manifestly unjust or one-sided. "73 Nu-
merous arbitral decisions consider applicability of customary mini-
mum standards of treatment in terms of the arbitrariness of the gov-
ernment actions in question. For example, in British Petroleum 
Exploration Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, the sole arbitrator found that 
the state's actions violated public international law because its taking 
of the inYestor's property "was made for purely extraneous political 
il \'.f. GARCIA-AMADOR l:T AL., RECENT CODIFICA'nON OF 'niE LAW 0}' STATE RESPON-
SIRII.ITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 196 (1974). 
i2 SccADF Group Final Award, supra note 14, paras. 190-91; Mondev Final Award, su-
pra note 19, paras. 127, 156. 
i3 This is the formulation of a substantive denial of justice provided by Vattel, Le Droit 
des Gens (1758) Book II, Chapter 18, para. 350; translated by CJ. Fenwick in:J.B. Scott, ed., 
Classics of Intemationa/ Law ('Washington, Carnegie Institution: 1916). 
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reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in character. "74 Substan-
tive denials of justice such as this one also could be considered an 
abuse of right under international law. As Bin Cheng noted in his re-
nowned treatise on the principles of international law, the doctrine of 
abuse of rights stems from the principle of good faith. He summa-
rized his view of the doctrine as follows: 
[D]iscretion must be exercised in good faith, and the law 
will intervene in all cases where this discretion is abused .... 
Whenever, therefore, the owner of a right enjoys a certain 
discretionary power, this must be exercised in good faith, 
which means that it must be exercised reasonably, honestly, 
in conformity with the spirit of the law and with due regard 
to the interest of others.75 
The exercise of a right-or a supposed right, since the right 
no longer exists-for the sole purpose of causing injury to 
another is thus prohibited. Every right is the legal protection 
of a legitimate interest. An alleged exercise of a right not in 
furtherance of such interest, but with the malicious purpose 
of injuring others can no longer claim protection of the 
law.76 
The principle of good faith requires every right to be exer-
cised honestly and loyally. Any fictitious exercise of a right 
for the purpose of evading either a rule of law or a contrac-
tual obligation will not be tolerated. Such an exercise consti-
tutes an abuse of the right, prohibited by law.77 
In addition to these customary international law doctrines, which 
generally should be applicable to any regulatory action, NAITA tri-
bunals also should consider the relevant SPS principles when neces-
sary. For Article ll05, such principles include: (1) the right of gov-
ernments to impose SPS measures; (2) the procedural principle 
expressed in NAITA Article 712(3), that a measure be based upon 
scientific principles, not maintained when the scientific basis for it no 
longer exists, and based upon a risk assessment; and (3) that the 
74 British Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I. L. R. 297, 329 
(1973) (final award of Arbitrator Lagergren). 
75 BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 132-34(1987). 
76 !d. at 122. 
77 !d. at 123. 
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measure be developed and implemented in a transparent manner 
(which is reflected in NAITA Article 718). Given the nature of Article 
1105, these principles should be applied in a manner that accords 
considerable deference to governmental authority, while ensuring 
that such authority is not exercised in a truly unreasonable or arbi-
trary manner. 78 
The ultimate purpose of the NAFTA Parties' SPS obligations is to 
reduce or eliminate the ways in which failures of transparency and 
procedural uncertainty abet inappropriate regulatory conduct.79 If an 
economic actor understands the kind of regulatory system at work, 
and can see how it generates a certain result, this will reduce the ca-
pacity for a government, or official, to abuse regulatory discretion. 
Normally, an improper exercise of discretion can be hidden, and even 
if it is not hidden, it can be evidenced only in the apparent arbitrari-
ness of-<>r lack of rationality behind-a given regulatory decision. As 
Professor George Schwarzenberger once noted (long before the es-
tablishment of the WfO or the NAITA SPS regimes), these abuses of 
discretion form the "hard core" of the doctrine and must be rooted 
out, no matter how difficult the task: 
/d. 
Arbitrariness in any form is-or ought to be-abhorrent to 
homo jzuidicus. His whole professional outlook is dominated 
by the attitude that, in the eyes of the law, equal situations 
require equal remedies.so 
Yet, anybody who is acquainted with the techniques by which 
judicial precedents are applied and distinguished is aware of 
the element of subjectivity which is inseparable from decid-
ing, even on a judicial level, what situations are supposed to 
be equal. 
78 See, e.g., Myers Interim Merits Award, supra note 43, para. 263, which provides: 
The Tribunal considers that a breach of Article 1105 occurs only when it is 
shown that an itwestor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary man-
ner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the interna-
tional perspective. That determination must be made in the light of the high 
measure of deference that international law generally extends to the right of 
domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders. The de-
termination must also take into account any specific rules of international law 
that are applicable to the case. 
79 Howse, mpra note 40, at 2336, although he does not explicitly recognize the role of 
legal certainty in combination with transparency. 
80 Gt:ORGt: SCIIWARZENBI:RGt:R, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 100 (1971). 
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In the fields of quasi-judicial, administrative or political deci-
sions, it is even more difficult to verify the arbitrary exercise 
of discretion. The wider the scope of discretion, the easier it 
is to find plausible arguments to hide irrelevant or objec-
tionable reasons. If discretion is exercised within a wide 
framework of territorial jurisdiction, only the most potent 
abuses of sovereignty could possibly be caught by any prohi-
bition of the arbitrary use of sovereign right.8 ' 
SPS regimes provide an answer to this dilemma. They provide 
the certainty and transparency that come from structuring discretion. 
It is in this sense that "sound science" can be a tool of considerable 
importance to the trade or investment lawyer. 
However, as Wirth indicates, SPS principles provide no panacea. 
They also do not extend to the process of second-guessing the sci-
entific judgment of the regulator. The principle that a measure must 
be based on "scientific principles" and be discontinued where there is 
"no longer a scientific basis" merely asks whether such judgment was 
actually exercised.82 Science accordingly can be seen as a necessary 
component of the regulatory review process, rather than the only 
relevant factor. Within the context of this principle, as imbedded in 
Article 1105, a tribunal is called upon only to consider whether 
sufficient evidence exists to indicate that science is properly inform-
ing the political exercise of risk management. It is not supposed to 
consider whether "some threshold of scientific proof or certainty [ex-
ists] below which democratic judgments about risk regulation are ille-
gitimate. "83 
In the Beef Hormones Report, the Appellate Body interpreted 
Article 5.1 of the WTO SPS Agreement (which is akin to NAFTA Arti-
cle 712(3) (c)) as implying the need for a justified, rational basis for a 
measure based upon a risk assessment conducted prior to its inlposi-
tion. All that would be required to satisfy this obligation, as received 
in to Article 1105, would be sufficient evidence of a nexus between the 
risks identified in a valid assessment procedure and the operation of 
the measure.84 A valid risk assessment will exist wherever a govern-
ment has: (1) identified a problem and its possible biological and 
81 /d. at 100-01. 
82 See Wirth, supra note 30, at 855 (although his prescription would be even more def-
erential than the one provided by the Appellate Body and advocated here). See id. 
83 Howse, supra note 40, at 2341. 
84 /d. at 2342 (citing Beef Hormones Report, supra note 33, para. 194). 
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economic consequences; (2) evaluated the likelihood of the introduc-
tion of the agent for this problem; and (3) evaluated the impact of 
the proposed measure upon the risk so identified.85 Because the 
European Union (EU) had not conducted a risk assessment for one 
of the hormones at issue in that case, and because it had not con-
ducted an assessment related to the risk upon which its measures were 
based (i.e., the risk from improper veterinary practices in respect of 
the other five hormones at issue in the case), the EU was found to 
have failed to base its measure on a valid risk assessment.86 
In Australian Salmon Report, Australia failed to meet this test 
because it was found only to have complied with its first prong. This is 
because Australia did not undertake a quantitative assessment or a 
qualitative assessment of the probability of the introduction of the 
fish-borne diseases that its measure targeted, or an analysis of how the 
measure would impact upon such probabilities. While the Appellate 
Body's analysis here is certainly something more than merely inquir-
ing as to whether something that a government labels a "risk assess-
ment" exists, it does not go so far as to question the ability of a gov-
ernment to make SPS decisions. It may do so as long as the assessment 
is undertaken properly, no matter how low the appropriate level of 
risk ultimately becomes. 
Similarly, a measure could run afoul of this basic SPS principle if 
the claimant could prove that no rational relationship exists between 
the risks identified in the assessment and the measure as designed 
and imposed. For example, in the Japanese Agricultural Products Re-
port, the Appellate Body concluded that Japan's de facto require-
ment, that all foreigners demonstrate the efficacy of quarantine and 
fumigation measures for every variety of plant imaginable, was not 
rationally connected to the available risk assessments. No causal link 
had been established between differences in plant variety and differ-
ences in the efficacy of quarantine treatment because the available 
scientific evidence simply did not address the issue. While a govern-
ment would be perfectly entitled to base its decision on conflicting 
scientific eYidence, a rational relationship between that evidence and 
the measure must nonetheless exist.87 
As demonstrated by the doctrine developed and applied by the 
Appellate Body in these cases, David G. Victor has concluded that the 
85 Australian Salmon Report, supra note 33, para. 121. 
86 Beef Hormones Report, supra note 33, para. 200. 
Bi Japanese Agricultural Products Report, supm note 33, paras. 76-85. 
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requirement for a measure to be "based on science" and a "valid risk 
assessment" likely will result in "a convergence in procedures that 
countries follow when setting SPS policies but not necessarily conver-
gence in particular regulatory outcomes. "88 To the extent that such a 
convergence can be considered state practice, this SPS principle 
should become even more firmly ensconced in the applicable interna-
tional law which will be available whenever a NAFTA tribunal inter-
prets Article 1105.89 
It also should be noted that failures in transparency have already 
been found by one NAFTA tribunal as relevant to its finding of a 
breach of Article 1105.90 Recall that NAFTA Article 102 ( 1) provides 
that transparency is a primary lens through which NAFTA's liberaliz-
ing objectives must be focused, in aid of a tribunal's interpretation of 
any NAFTA provision. The failure of a NAFTA government to meet its 
obligations under NAFTA Article 718 or Article 7 of the WfO SPS 
Agreement does not constitute a per se breach of NAFTA Article 1105; 
however, in the words of the Myers Tribunal, it certainly can provide 
evidence of a failure to accord the necessary amount of "fair and eq-
uitable treatment" to an investment in any given case.91 
The Appellate Body already has concluded that the manner in 
which the Japanese varietal testing requirements were imposed (with-
out sufficient publication or notification, but rather through the ac-
cumulation of various de facto requirements) violated the principle of 
transparency.92 The significance of this finding should not be under-
estimated. Without sufficient transparency, science-based regulatory 
disciplines cannot function because the lack of transparency acts as an 
impediment to fully-informed (and therefore rational) democratic 
decision-making.93 Similar failures could lead to a determination that 
Article 1105 has been breached if they result in harm to an investor or 
investment. 
88 David. G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organiza-
tion: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U.J. lNT'L L. & PoL. 865, 872 (2000). 
89 See ADF Group Final Award, supra note 14, para. 184. 
90 Metalclad Final Award, supra note 24, paras. 88, 99. This aspect of the Tribunal's 
award was the subject of a judicial review proceeding in which a British Columbia judge 
inappropriately substituted his opinion of how Article 1105 should be interpreted for that 
of the Tribunal. As I have explained elsewhere, it is unlikely that the judge's opinion will 
sway many international lawyers in the long run. See generally Todd Weiler, ~Ietalclad v. 
Mexico: A Play in Three Parts, 2 J. WoRLD INVEST. 685 (2001). 
91 Myers Interim Merits Award, supra note 43, para. 264. 
92Japanese Agricultural Products Report, supra note 33, para. 108. 
93 See Howse, supra note 40, at 2336-37. 
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v. NAFTAARTICLE 1110 
While certainly the centerpiece of concern for environmentalists, 
as well as free trade opponents, NAFTA Article 111 0-by which 
NAFTA governments promise to provide full, fair and effective com-
pensation whenever they directly or indirectly "take" an investment-
has had a largely unremarkable existence. So far, only one tribunal 
has found a breach of Article 1110 and ordered compensation to be 
paid. 94 Why the concern with Article Ill 0? Article Ill 0 ( 1) provides as 
follows: 
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expro-
priate an investment of an investor of another Party in its 
territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), ex-
cept: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 
1105(1); and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 through 6. 
This expropriation obligation covers direct confiscations as well 
as indirect, or "creeping," expropriations of investments-but nothing 
more. It includes regulatory measures, such as SPS measures. How-
ever, unless the degree of government interference with an invest-
ment is found to be sufficiently "substantial," a finding of expropria-
tion cannot be made. Substantial interference involves the kind of 
deprivation that would lead a tribunal to conclude that the investor 
has lost its ability to use, enjoy or dispose of an investment, whether it 
effectively has been confiscated or not.95 There is nothing particularly 
notable about this state of the law. Expropriation only applies to the 
"nuclear warheads" of government regulation, which can lay waste to 
an investment without the payment of compensation. 
To limit the application of this obligation further, so far two tri-
bunals have concluded that any interference caused by a measure that 
affects merely a portion of the business undertaken by an investment 
generally will not be considered sufficient enough so long as the in-
94 Metalclad Final Award, supra note 24, para. 112. 
95 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, paras. 101-02 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., 2000) (in-
terim merits a\vard), available at http:/ /www.naftalaw.org. 
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vestment enterprise (which constitutes the "investment" under Arti-
cles 1110 and 1139) continues to operate.96 Accordingly, the larger 
the company, the more unlikely it is that it will be able to prove an 
expropriation, unless it structures its investments as a discrete number 
of separate businesses. 
Moreover, the Feldman Tribunal has gone even further, by noting: 
No one can seriously question that in some circumstances 
government regulatory activity can be a violation of Article 
1110. For example, in Pope & Talbot, Canada argued that 
"mere interference is not expropriation; rather, a significant 
degree of deprivation of fundamental rights of ownership is 
required." That tribunal rejected this approach: 
"Regulations can indee4 be characterized in a way that 
would constitute creeping expropriation . . . . Indeed, 
much creeping expropriation could be conducted by 
regulation, and a blanket exception for regulatory meas-
ures would create a gaping loophole in international pro-
tection against expropriation. "97 
The Feldman Tribunal went on to conclude: 
[N]ot all government regulatory activity that makes it 
difficult or impossible for an investor to carry out a particu-
lar business, change in the law or change in the application 
of existing laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a 
particular business, is an expropriation under Article 1110. 
Governments, in their exercise of regulatory power, fre-
quently change their laws and regulations in response to 
changing economic circumstances or changing political, 
economic or social considerations. Those changes may well 
make certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to 
continue.98 
Based upon these preliminary comments, the Feldman Tribunal 
entered into a detailed and highly contextualized analysis of the regu-
latory scheme in question and of the investor's rights and entitle-
ments under it. It did so under the aegis of determining whether an 
"expropriation" (as mentioned in the chapeau of Article 1110(1)) had 
96 See Feldman Final Award, supra note 44, para. I 52. 
97 /d. para. II 0. 
98 !d. para. II2. 
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even taken place. In the Tribunal's opinion, sub-paragraphs (a) 
through (d) of Article 1110(1) added very little to the analysis, and 
accordingly did not need to be given "excessive weight. ''99 This was 
particularly true because most measures can be subjected to review 
under NAFTA's non-discrimination and "fair and equitable treat-
ment" provisions.Ioo 
In this case, Feldman apparently failed to prove that the business 
interest that he claimed was taken from him was actually an economic 
right to which he was entitled. His business relied upon a grey market 
created by the operation of the tax regime. The government ap-
peared to have a long-standing tax policy against the operation of 
such businesses, and while its enforcement was flawed (in that some 
businesses were able to take advantage of the grey market much 
longer than others), it was justified in principle. Accordingly, while 
Mexico may have violated Article 1102 in application of its tax regime, 
it did not perpetrate a compensable taking merely because finally it 
dosed some of the loopholes through which the investor had been 
profiting. 
How this analysis would apply to the facts of an environmental 
taking is an open question, but certainly it would appear that a de-
tailed analysis of whether the claimant legitimately possesses an ac-
quired right to operate its business (in the face of environmental im-
pacts or regulation) will be front-and-center in future cases, regardless 
of whether Article 1110 (1) seems to provide otherwise. 
If the Article 1110 analysis involves an SPS measure, the matter 
becomes even more delicate. This is because Article 1110 protects 
fundamental ownership rights in a manner different from Articles 
1102, 1103, and 1105. Whereas these provisions protect against some 
degree of interference with an investor or investment, Article 1110 
deals with the more serious issue of the fundamental deprivation of 
the basic right to operate one's investment in the territory of a 
NAFTA Party. On the other hand, there remains the fundamental 
right of governments to protect their citizens, in this case through the 
development and imposition of SPS measures. 
In such a context, the SPS principles discussed above should 
come into play in determining whether compensation must be paid 
under Article 1110. In addition, the necessity of the imposition of the 
SPS measure must be considered. Rob Howse has argued that the 
99 !d. para. 135. 
wo Sec Pope & Talbot Damages Award, supra note 63, para. Ill. 
256 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 26:229 
wro obligations that contribute to this principle (Articles 2.2 and 5.6 
of the WfO SPS Agreement) do not permit a WfO panel to apply a 
proportionality test in determining whether the measure truly was 
necessary. Using such a test would invite a tribunal to consider possi-
ble trade-offs between the chosen level of protection and the harm-
fulness of the economic impacts of the measure designed to achieve 
that level of protection. This would be an unacceptable intrusion into 
state sovereignty. Rather, applying Howse's analysis to the investment 
context, the SPS necessity principle only requires: (1) that the meas-
ure is applied in a manner consistent with its stated objectives (which, 
in turn, are rationally connected to an appropriate risk analysis); and 
(2) that an alternative avenue of fully addressing that risk-which 
would have been less harmful to the ownership interests at stake-did 
not exist.101 
As the Appellate Body noted in the Australian Salmon Report, a 
three-pronged test can be used to determine whether an alternative 
measure exists (which, by definition, would render the measure at 
issue "unnecessary" and thus improperly imposed). The alternative 
measure must: (1) be "reasonably available taking into account tech-
nical and economic feasibility;" (2) achieve "the appropriate level" of 
protection; and (3) be "significantly less restrictive" than the measure 
chosen.l02 Such an alternative still might cause harm to the invest-
ment, but it should not result in a near-total deprivation of the right 
to operate the investment and derive economic benefits from it. 
Accordingly, the analysis of an SPS measure under Article Ill 0 is 
somewhat less deferential than it would be under Articles 1102, 1103, 
or 1105, owing to the far more serious nature of the interference in 
question. However, to receive compensation under Article 1110, the 
claimant would have to prove: (1) that an extremely high level of in-
terference had taken place; (2) that one or more of the SPS princi-
ples described above had been violated; (3) that the business of the 
investment was not so damaging to humans, plants, or animals as to 
be worth little to a notional purchaser-for-value under Article 
1110(2) ;103 and ( 4) that the circumstances of the investment demon-
strated that the investor had reason to believe its investment was op-
erating on solid regulatory ground (unlike the investor in Feldman, 
101 See Howse, supra note 40, at 2354-56. 
102 Australian Salmon Report, supra note 33, paras. 180-81. 
103 For an elucidation of this condition, see Todd Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Mer-
its Award in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 24 HASTINGS INT'L CoMP. L. REv. 173, 187-88 
(2001). 
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who was essentially taking advantage of flaws in a tax regime that ul-
timately were corrected to his detriment) .Io4 
VI. SPS PRINCIPLES IN APPLICATION 
In order to consider how these SPS principles might be applied 
in actual cases, it is useful to consider some of the existing NAFTA 
disputes that have yet to reach arbitration. One such case is Kenex Ltd. 
v. United States, which involves a proposed U.S. ban on all hemp food 
products. 105 Kenex is a Canadian-based hemp products producer that 
established a business in the United States with plans for expansion. 
In Canada, it manufactures industrial hemp products, including 
whole hemp grain, hemp grain derivatives (such as refined hemp oil, 
hemp nut, and hemp meal), hemp fiber, and certified hemp seed. It 
markets and distributes these products throughout North America. 
Industrial hemp is a variety of the plant species known as cannabis 
sativa L. Another variety of this plant species is marijuana. However, 
whereas marijuana typically contains between 3% and 15% of the psy-
choactive substance tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), industrial hemp 
contains only non-psychoactive trace amounts of THC (i.e., less than 
0.3%). For its products, Ken ex has even subscribed to the industry's 
"Test Pledge" standards, which limit its products to no more than 1.5 
parts ofTHC per million in shelled hempseed and 5 parts per million 
in hemp oil for food.I06 
V\l1ile marijuana and synthetic THC have been controlled sub-
stances for decades, industrial hemp products always have been ex-
empted from control under U.S. federal legislation. As a result, steril-
ized hempseed has been imported legally every year since the U.S. 
104 This last condition could be referred to as a legitimate expectation or an acquired 
right which was capable of protection under international law. For more information 
about these concepts, see IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC LAW 
133-39 (3rd ed. 1999). 
105 Ken ex Ltd. supra note 17. 
l06Jd. paras. 3-6. As indicated in Kenex's Notice of Intent: hemp seeds can be used di-
rectly as a food ingredient or crushed for oil and meal. Hemp seeds and flour are being 
used in nutrition bars, tortilla chips, pretzels, beer, salad dressings, cheese and ice cream, 
and as such are directly competitiYe with products such as flax, walnut, sesame and poppy 
seeds. Poppy seeds in particular are in a Yery similar position to hemp seeds, insofar as 
poppy seeds contain trace amounts of opiates that are controlled by the Controlled Sub-
stances Act in the U.S., but are specifically exempted from control along with their trace 
opiates. Hemp oil is also used in body-care products such as cosmetics, lotions, moisturiz-
ers and shampoos where it competes with emollient ingredients like lanolin and jojoba oil, 
as well as in nutritional Essential Fatty Acid (EFA) omega-3/omega-6 dietary supplements 
where it competes primarily with flax, eYening primrose and fish oil. !d. 
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Controlled Substances Act went into effect over seven decades ago.I07 
Nonetheless, in October 2001, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) issued an interpretive rule that effectively banned all industrial 
hemp products capable of human consumption by adding hemp to 
the list of controlled substances. It also issued a proposed rule that 
would have the same effect as the interpretive rule, amending the list 
explicitly to add industrial hemp products. The 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals has stayed both of these rules, pending applications by Ken ex 
and other industry members to have them struck as being beyond the 
scope of the DEA's authority. 
Ken ex has alleged breaches of NAITA Articles 1102 and 1105 in 
its notice of arbitration. Also, according to Kenex, the Government of 
Canada has expressed concerns to the DEA over this measure and has 
requested to see any risk assessment conducted prior to its implemen-
tation. This request apparently has been rebuffed by the DEA. Such 
conduct appears to violate NAFTA Articles 1803(2) and 718(1), and 
accordingly provides evidence of a lack of transparency under Article 
1105. More importantly, however, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, it appears that the United States has not based its measures 
on any sort of rationally-connected risk assessment. Thus, it appears 
that the United States could be found to have violated basic proce-
dural protections that are likely safeguarded under Article 1105. 
Under Article 1102, Kenex must prove that the effect of the U.S. 
measure has been to place it in an unfavourable competitive position 
by providing better treatment to its competitors. Under the Pope & 
Talbot test, Kenex's competitors appear to include those businesses 
that produce competing products such as poppy seeds or flax seed oil. 
The better treatment is easy to ascertain. It is treatment that does not 
include an outright ban on all of the investor's products. Accordingly, 
Kenex should be able to establish a J»ima facie breach of Article 1102, 
because the measure directly affects its ability to compete in these 
various industry sectors. Whether the United States will be able to 
provide a justification for the imposition of its measures is unclear. 
Assuming that the DEA actually has undertaken a secret risk analysis, 
and that the risks identified in that analysis can be rationally con-
nected to the aims of the measure, the United States still would be 
required to prove that its decision to impose an outright ban was not 
arbitrarily discriminatory. Given that industrial hemp contains such 
minute trace opiates, it may be difficult to satisfy this requirement; 
107 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802, et seq. (2003). 
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particularly since poppy seeds have not been similarly banned, even 
though they similarly contain trace opiates. Accordingly, it is quite 
possible that the United States will be found to have breached Article 
1102 as well. 
In another upcoming case, Crompton CmjJ. v. Canada,IOB the 
claimant has notified Canada that it may commence an arbitration 
with claims under Articles 1102, 1103, 1105, 1106, and 1110. Cromp-
ton is a U .S.-based company with a Canadian subsidiary involved in 
the production, marketing, and distribution of various pesticide 
products. One of those products contains the active ingredient lin-
dane, which is banned for use on canola crops in the United States 
but has been registered for use in Canada since 1978. In October 
1999, Crompton reluctantly agreed voluntarily to suspend its use of 
lindane until the Canadian Government had finished tests concern-
ing its safe use by the end of 2000. Crompton maintained an under-
standing that it could continue selling the remainder of its existing 
stock of lindane-based products until July 1, 2001. Instead of complet-
ing these planned lindane tests, however, the Government banned the 
use of Crompton's lindane-based products after July 1, 2001. 
If Crompton were to base its Article 1105 case on SPS principles 
alone, it would experience considerable difficulty. While Canada may 
not have completed its testing, as alleged, it likely would be able to 
rely on the portion of the risk assessment undertaken to ban Cromp-
ton's products. While Crompton might disagree, or be able to argue 
that the ban was not rationally connected to the tests undertaken, it is 
likely that sufficient deference would be paid to Canada to permit the 
measure to stand. On the other hand, and apart from the SPS analy-
sis, Crompton may be able to prove that it detrimentally relied on its 
agreement with Canada and is entitled to damages as a result. 
With regard to Articles 1102 and 1103, it is too early to conclude 
whether Crompton has a legitimate claim using SPS principles, but its 
prospects initially appear weak. While it may be able to prove that 
competitors have been placed in a better position because of the ban, 
and that their experience should be compared to that of Crompton, it 
would appear that Canada has sufficient justification for its measure. 
If lindane is indeed carcinogenic, and accordingly more dangerous to 
human, animal or plant life, or health than the products of competi-
lOS Crompton Corp., supra note 17. 
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tors, Canada would be justified in treating Crompton differently than 
its competitors.lo9 
Finally, with regard to Article 1110, Crompton appears to have a 
mixed case. On the one hand, it might well be able to prove that Can-
ada's move was premature (because it was not based on a complete 
risk assessment) and unnecessary (presumably because less intrusive 
alternatives existed, such as setting content or usage standards). On 
the other hand, while Crompton's subsidiary allegedly has lost its 
primary product line, it is still in business. If the "investment" at issue 
is this enterprise, Crompton's case could go the way of Pope & Talbot 
and Feldman, where the courts determined that the interference was 
not severe enough because the investment enterprise was still in busi-
ness (albeit in a different line than before the imposition of the 
measure in question).110 Moreover, given that lindane was already 
banned in the United States, it might be argued that Crompton knew 
it was "trading on borrowed time" and thus could not argue success-
fully that it possessed a right to produce and market the product 
indefinitely. However, the matter is far from clear and is difficult to dis-
cern at such an early stage. 
Finally, with respect to the Methanex claim, which was responsible 
over the past few years for much of the uproar in certain circles 
against NAITA Chapter 11, it is unclear whether the case would have 
succeeded. This would be the case even if Methanex had been a pro-
ducer of MTBE rather than just a producer of one of its ingredients. 
This is because California passed legislation that particularly sought to 
assess the risks of the continued use of MTBE. While Methanex cer-
tainly could argue that it was unfair to ban MTBE from California, 
rather than attacking the root causes of the way in which MTBE con-
taminated the water supply, the bottom line was that a risk assessment 
occurred and that there was sufficient notice provided to companies 
such as Methanex. Accordingly, it is doubtful that Methanex would 
109 Note how, because the focus is on the businesses of competing investors, it is a le-
gitimate inquiry to consider whether the products made by these competitors are actually 
"like products." I earlier frowned upon the Appellate Body for differentiating between 
naturally occurring hormones and administered hormones at the justification stage, rather 
than at the initial stage of comparison, but in that case the goods were the focal point of 
the analysis, rather than the competitive position of the producers of such goods. 
110 This circumstance could be contrasted with the taking of a trademark (e.g., elimi-
nating the right of a tobacco company to market cigarettes in anything other than plain 
packaging), which would also qualify as an "investment" under the expansive definition 
contained within NAFTA Article 1139. 
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have had a successful claim under Article 1105, at least in so far as it 
would have been based upon SPS principles. 
Similarly, it is not clear that Methanex could have succeeded in 
its national treatment claim on the grounds that a ban on MTBE was 
arbitrary or unjustifiable. It is not the role of a trade or investment 
tribunal to second guess the merits of a risk management decision, so 
long as it appears to be appropriately based upon a valid risk assess-
ment process and explainable in terms of any differential impact on 
the makers of competing products. If those products contain different 
profiles or characteristics that relate to the risk targeted by the meas-
ure, any differences in treatment will likely be justified as well. 
Finally, with respect to Article 1110, Me than ex would have faced 
the same problem Crompton faced, and which stung Feldman and Pope 
& Talbot. While California's decision likely would have dealt a stinging 
blow to Methanex's investment enterprise, the enterprise would have 
continued to exist, and thus the decision would not have met easily 
the high threshold of "substantial interference" required under Arti-
cle 1110. However, at least in Article 1110, Me than ex could rightly 
debate the necessity of a complete ban on its product (again, assum-
ing that methane was actually banned, rather than MTBE), given the 
existence of less-restrictive measures that would address completely 
the risks posed by its entry into the water supply (i.e., better enforce-
ment of underground storage tank regulations and stricter regulation 
of the use of personal watercraft on reservoirs). The only question 
would be whether such alternatives would be technically feasible and 
not too expensive to impose. 
As its stands, however, Methanex has been reduced to arguing 
that it has been treated less favourably than a domestic competitor 
(U .S.-based Archer Daniels Midland). Specifically, this competitor 
(the primary producer of ethanol, a competing product) appears to 
have convinced state officials to impose a ban that favors ethanol, ar-
guing that state officials and the Tribunal should consider Methanex 
a competitor. III The claim is proceeding on this basis because the par-
ties agreed at the jurisdictional hearing that if the measure was im-
posed with the intent to treat foreign competitors (such as Methanex) 
less favorably than domestic competitors, the measure could be said 
lit Sec generally Methanex Corp. v. United States (Nov. 5, 2002) (second amended 
statement of claim), available at www.naftalaw.org. 
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to "relate to" Methanex and its investment under Article 1101, even 
though it only mentioned MTBE in its text.112 
CoNCLUSION 
Using a careful, contextual, and purposeful analysis, it is possible 
to read into the obligations of NAITA Chapter 11 the same "sound 
science" bargain that has been struck in NAFTA Chapter 7B and the 
WTO SPS Agreement. With the jurisprudence of the WfO Appellate 
Body as their guide, future NAITA tribunals can employ a scientific 
method to aid their review processes, without going so far as to sec-
ond guess the scientific judgment of regulators. The process can 
work. All we need now are some cases to prove it. 
112 Methanex Final Award, supra note 15, para. 151. 
